The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we develop the measurement theory of polarization for the case in which income distributions can be described using density functions. Second, we provide sample estimators of population polarization indices that can be used to compare polarization across time or entities. Distribution-free statistical inference results are also derived in order to ensure that the orderings of polarization across entities are not simply due to sampling noise. An illustration of the use of these tools using data from 21 countries shows that polarization and inequality orderings can often differ in practice.
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Introduction
Initiated by Ray (1991, 1994) , Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolfson (1994) , there has been a recent upsurge of interest in the measurement of polarization 1 and in the use of such measures as a correlate of different aspects of socioeconomic performance. It seems fairly widely accepted that polarization is a concept that is distinct from inequality, and that -at least in principle -it could be connected with several aspects of social, economic and political change.
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Following Ray (1991, 1994) , we rely almost exclusively on what might be called the identification-alienation framework. The idea is simple: polarization is related to the alienation that individuals and groups feel from one another, but such alienation is fuelled by notions of within-group identity. In concentrating on such phenomena, we do not mean to suggest that instances in which a single isolated individual runs amok with a machine gun are rare, or that they are unimportant in the larger scheme of things. Rather, these are not the objects of our enquiry. We are interested in the correlates of organized, large-scale social unrest -strikes, demonstrations, processions, widespread violence, and revolt or rebellion. Such phenomena thrive on differences, to be sure. But they cannot exist without notions of group identity either.
This brief discussion immediately suggests that inequality, inasmuch as it concerns itself with interpersonal alienation, captures but one aspect of polarization. To be sure, there are some obvious changes that would be branded as both inequalityand polarization-enhancing. For instance, if two income groups are further separated by increasing economic distance, inequality and polarization would presumably both increase. However, local equalizations of income differences at two different ranges of the income distribution will most likely lead to two better-defined groups -each with a clearer sense of itself and the other. In this case, inequality will have come down but polarization may be on the rise.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we develop the measurement theory of polarization for the case in which the relevant distributions can be described by density functions. There are many such instances, the most important being income, consumption and wealth -regrouped under "income" for short. The reason for doing so is simple: with sample data aggregated along income intervals, it is unclear how to provide a statistically satisfactory account of whether distributive measures (based on such data) are significantly different across time or entities. Indeed, a rapidly burgeoning literature on the statistics of inequality and poverty measurement shows how to construct appropriate statistical tests for such measures using disaggregated data (see, e.g., Beach and Davidson, (1983) , Beach and Richmond (1985) , Bishop et al. (1989) , Kakwani (1993) , Anderson (1996) , and 1 See Ray (1991, 1994) , Foster and Wolfson (1992) , Wolfson (1994 Wolfson ( , 1997 , Alesina and Spolaore (1997) , Quah (1997) , Wang and Tsui (2000) , Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1998) , Chakravarty and Majumder (2001) , Zhang and Kanbur (2001) and Rodríguez and Salas (2002) .
2 See, for instance, D'Ambrosio and Wolff (2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2001) , Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000) , Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) , Gradín (2000) , Knack and Keefer (2001) , Milanovic (2000) , Quah (1997) and Reynal-Querol (2002) . See also Esteban and Ray (1999) for a formal analysis of the connections between polarization and the equilibrium level of conflict in a model of strategic interaction.
2 Duclos (1997, 2000) ). A rigorous axiomatic development of the polarization concept in the "density case" is then a prerequisite for proper statistical examination of polarization.
In this paper we concentrate on the axiomatics and estimation of "pure income polarization", that is, of indices of polarization for which individuals identify themselves only with those with similar income levels. This brings us to the second, predominantly statistical, issue of how the estimation of polarization is to be conducted. The main problem is how to estimate the size of the groups to which individuals belong. Again, using arbitrary income intervals would appear somewhat unsatisfactory. Instead, we estimate group size non-parametrically using kernel density procedures. A natural estimator of the polarization indices is then given by substituting the distribution function by the empirical distribution function. Assuming that we are using a random sample of independently and identically distributed observations of income, we show that the resulting estimator has a limiting normal distribution with parameters that can be estimated free of assumptions on the true (but unknown) distribution of incomes. Distribution-free statistical inference can then be applied to ensure that the orderings of polarization across entities are not simply due to sampling noise.
It is useful to locate this paper in the context of the earlier step in the measurement of polarization in Esteban and Ray (1994) -ER from now on. The measure derived in ER was based on a discrete, finite set of income groupings located in a continuous ambient space of possible income values. This generated two major problems, one conceptual and the other practical. At the conceptual level we have the drawback that the measure presents an unpleasant discontinuity. This is precisely due to the fact that ER is based on a population distributed over a discrete and distinct number of points. 3 The practical difficulty is that the population is assumed to have already been bunched in the relevant groups. This feature rendered the measure of little use for many interesting problems. 4 As mentioned above, the present paper addresses both problems and provides what we hope is a useable measure.
In addition, the main axioms that we use to characterize income polarization are substantially different from ER (though they are similar in spirit). In large part, this is due to the fact that we are dealing with a completely different domain (spaces of densities). We therefore find it of interest that these new axioms end up characterizing a measure of polarization that turns out to be the natural extension of ER to the case of continuous distributions. At a deeper level, there are, however, important differences, such as the different bounds on the "polarization-sensitivity" parameter α that are obtained.
In Section 2 we axiomatically characterize a measure of pure income polarization and examine its properties. In Section 3, we turn to estimation and inference issues for polarization measures. In Section 4 , we illustrate the axiomatic and statistical results using data drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data sets for 21 countries. We compute the Gini coefficient and the polarization measure for these countries for years in Wave 3 (1989 Wave 3 ( -1992 and Wave 4 (1994 Wave 4 ( -1997 , and show that the two indices furnish distinct information on the shape of the distributions. Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses an important extension. All proofs are in Section 6.
Measuring Income Polarization
The purpose of this section is to proceed towards a full axiomatization of income polarization.
2.1. Starting Point. The domain under consideration is the class of all continuous (unnormalized) densities in IR + , with their integrals corresponding to various population sizes. Let f be such a density. An individual located at income x is presumed to feel a sense of identification that depends on the density at x, f (x). More generally, one might consider the possibility that individuals have a nondegenerate "window of identification". However, the foundations for the width of such an identification window appear unclear. We have therefore opted for defining our family of polarization measures for the limit case when the window width becomes zero. The discussion in Section 2.4.4 makes this last statement more precise.
An individual located at x feels alienation |x − y| as far as an individual located at y is concerned. As in ER, we write the effective antagonism of x towards y (under f ) as some nonnegative function
where i = f (x) and a = |x − y|. It is assumed that T is increasing in its second argument and that T (0, a) = T (i, 0) = 0, just as in ER. We take polarization to be proportional to the "sum" of all effective antagonisms:
(1)
This class of measures is neither very useful nor operational. In particular, much depends on the choice of the functional form T . In what follows, we place axioms on this starting point so as to pin down this functional form.
Axioms.
2.2.1. Densities and Basic Operations. Our axioms will largely be based on domains that are unions of one or more very simple densities f that we will call basic densities. These are unnormalized (by population), are symmetric and unimodal, and have compact support.
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To be sure, f can be population rescaled to any population p by simply multiplying f pointwise by p to arrive at a new distribution pf (unnormalized). Likewise, f can undergo a slide. A slide to the right by x is just a new density g such that g(y) = f (y − x). Likewise for a slide to the left. And f with mean µ can be income rescaled to any new mean µ that we please as follows:
6 These operations maintain symmetry and unimodality and therefore keep us within the class of basic densities.
5 By symmetry we mean that f (m − x) = f (m + x) for all x ∈ [0, m], where m is the mean and by unimodality we mean that f is nondecreasing on [0, m] . 6 The reason for this particular formulation is best seen by examining the corresponding cumulative distribution functions, which must satisfy the property that G(x) = F (xµ /µ), and then taking derivatives.
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If we think of slides and scalings as inducing a partition of the basic densities, each collection of basic densities in the same element of the partition may be associated with a root, a basic density with mean 1 and support [0, 2] , with population size set to unity. That is, one can transform any basic density to its root by a set of scalings and slides. [This concept will be important both in the axioms as well as in the main proof.] Two distinct roots differ in "shape", a quality that cannot be transformed by the above operations.
Finally, we shall also use the concept of a squeeze, defined as follows. Let f be any basic density with mean µ and let λ lie in (0, 1]. A λ-squeeze of f is a transformation as follows:
A (λ-) squeeze is, in words, a very special sort of mean-preserving reduction in the spread of f . It concentrates more weight on the global mean of the distribution, as opposed to what would be achieved, say, with a progressive Dalton transfer on the same side of the mean. Thus a squeeze truly collapses a density inwards towards its global mean. The following properties can be formally established.
[P.1] For each λ ∈ (0, 1), f λ is a density.
[P.2] For each λ ∈ (0, 1), f λ has the same mean as f .
[P.4] As λ ↓ 0, f λ converges weakly to the degenerate measure granting all weight to µ.
Notice that there is nothing in the definition that requires a squeeze to be applied to symmetric unimodal densities with compact support. In principle, a squeeze as defined could be applied to any density. However, the axioms to be placed below acquire additional cogency when limited to such densities.
Statement of the Axioms.
We will impose four axioms on the polarization measure. Axiom 1. If a distribution is composed of a single basic density, then a squeeze of that density cannot increase polarization.
Axiom 1 is self-evident. A squeeze, as defined here, corresponds to a global compression of any basic density. If only one of these makes up the distribution (see Figure 1) , then the distribution is globally compressed and we must associate this with no higher polarization. Viewed in the context of our background model, however, it is clear that Axiom 1 is going to generate some interesting restrictions. This is because a squeeze creates a reduction in inter-individual alienation but also serves to raise identification for a positive measure of agents -those located "centrally" in the distribution. The implied restriction is, then, that the latter's positive impact on polarization must be counterbalanced by the former's negative impact.
Our next axiom considers an initial situation (see Figure 2 ) composed of three disjoint densities all sharing the same root. The situation is completely symmetric, with densities 1 and 3 having the same total population and with density 2 exactly midway between densities 1 and 3. Axiom 2. If a symmetric distribution is composed of three basic densities with the same root and mutually disjoint supports, then a symmetric squeeze of the side densities cannot reduce polarization.
In some sense, this is the defining axiom of polarization. This is precisely what we used to motivate the concept. Notice that this axiom argues that a particular "local" squeeze (as opposed to the "global" squeeze of the entire distribution in Axiom 1) must not bring down polarization. At this stage there is an explicit departure from inequality measurement.
Our third axiom considers a symmetric distribution composed of four basic densities, once again all sharing the same root.
Axiom 3. Consider a symmetric distribution composed of four basic densities with the same root and mutually disjoint supports, as in Figure 3 . Slide the two middle densities to the side as shown (keeping all supports disjoint). Then polarization must go up.
Our final axiom is a simple population-invariance principle. It states that if one situation exhibits greater polarization than another, it must continue to do so when populations in both situations are scaled up or down by the same amount, leaving all (relative) distributions unchanged. Axiom 4. If P (F ) ≥ P (G) and p > 0, then P (pF ) ≥ P (pG), where pF and pG represent (identical) population scalings of F and G respectively.
Characterization Theorem.
Theorem 1. A measure P , as described in (1), satisfies Axioms 1-4 if and only if it is proportional to
where α ∈ [0.25, 1].
2.4. Discussion. Several aspects of this theorem require extended discussion.
2.4.1. Scaling . Theorem 1 states that a measure of polarization satisfying the preceding four axioms has to be proportional to the measure we have characterized.
We may wish to exploit this degree of freedom to make the polarization measure scale-free. Homogeneity of degree zero can be achieved, if desired, by multiplying P α (F ) by µ α−1 , where µ is mean income. It is easy to see that this procedure is equivalent to one in which all incomes are normalized by their mean, and (3) is subsequently applied. 2.4.2. Importance of the IA Structure. The theorem represents a particularly sharp characterization of the class of polarization measures that satisfy both the axioms we have imposed and the IA structure. It must be emphasized that both these factors play a role in pinning down our functional form. In fact, it can be checked that several other measures of polarization satisfy Axioms 1-4, though we omit this discussion for the sake of brevity. The IA framework is, therefore, an essential part of the argument.
2.4.3. Partial Ordering. At the same time, and despite the sharpness of the functional form, notice that we do not obtain a complete ordering for polarization, nor do we attempt to do this. 7 A range of values of α is entertained in the theorem. The union of the complete orderings generated by each value gives us a partial order for polarization. Pinning down this order completely is an open question.
Identification Windows.
We now turn to a discussion of our choice of basing identification on the point density. We may more generally suppose that individuals possess a "window of identification" as in ER, section 4. Individuals within this window would be considered "similar" -possibly with weights decreasing 7 Indeed, it is possible to impose additional requirements (along the lines explored by ER, for instance) to place narrower bounds on α. But we do not consider this necessarily desirable. For instance, the upper value α = 1 has the property that all λ-squeezes of any distribution leave polarization unchanged. We do not feel that a satisfactory measure must possess this feature. This is the reason we are more comfortable with a possible range of acceptable values for α. with the distance -and would contribute to a sense of group identity. At the same time, individuals would feel alienated only from those outside the window. Thus, broadening one's window of identification has two effects. First, it includes more neighbors when computing one's sense of identification. Second, it reduces one's sense of distance with respect to aliens -because the width of the identification window affects the "starting point" for alienation.
These two effects can be simultaneously captured in our seemingly narrower model. Let t be some parameter representing the "breadth" in identification. Suppose that this means that each individual x will consider an individual with income y to be at the point (1 − t)x + ty. [Thus t is inversely proportional to "breadth".] The "perceived density" of y from the vantage point of an individual located at x is then 1
so that if t < 1, the sense of identification is generally heightened (simply set x = y above). Thus a small value of t stands for greater identification. It can be easily shown that the polarization measure resulting from this extended notion of identification is proportional to our measure by the factor t 1−α . Therefore, broadening the sense of identification simply amounts to a re-scaling of the measure defined for the limit case in which one is identified with individuals having exactly the same income.
It is also possible to directly base identification on the average density over a non-degenerate window. It can be shown that when our polarization measure is rewritten to incorporate this notion of identification, it converges precisely to the measure in Theorem 1 as the size of the window converges to zero. Thus an alternative view of point-identification is that it is a robust approximation to "narrow" identification windows.
2.4.5. Asymmetric Alienation. In ER we already pointed out that in some environments our implicit hypothesis of a symmetric sense of alienation might not be appropriate. It can be argued that while individuals may feel alienated with respect to those with higher income or wealth, such sentiments need not be reciprocated. For the extreme case of purely one-sided alienation the appropriate extension would be
[This is not to say that we have axiomatized such an extension.] 2.4.6. Remarks on the Proof, and the Derived Bounds on α. The proof of Theorem 1 is long and involved, so a brief roadmap may be useful here. The first half of the proof shows that our axioms imply (3), along with the asserted bounds on α. We begin by noting that the function T must be (weakly) concave in alienation (Lemmas 1 and 2). Axiom 2 yields this. Yet by Lemmas 3 and 4 (which centrally employ Axiom 3), T must be (weakly) convex as well. These two assertions must imply that T is linear in alienation, and so is of the form T (i, a) = φ(i)a for some function φ. (Lemma 4 again). Lemma 5 completes the derivation of our functional form by using the population invariance principle (Axiom 4) to argue that φ must exhibit constant elasticity. Our measure bears an interesting resemblance to the Gini coefficient. Indeed, if α = 0, the measure is the Gini coefficient. However, our arguments ensure that not only is α > 0, it cannot go below some uniformly positive lower bound, which happens to be 0.25. Where, in the axioms and in the IA structure, does such a bound lurk? To appreciate this, consider Axiom 2, which refers to a double-squeeze of two "side" basic densities. Such squeezes bring down internal alienations in each component density. Yet the axiom demands that overall polarization not fall. It follows, therefore, that the increased identifications created by the squeeze must outweigh the decreased within-component alienation. This restricts α. It cannot be too low.
By a similar token, α cannot be too high either. The bite here comes from Axiom 1, which decrees that a single squeeze (in an environment where there is just one basic component) cannot increase polarization. Once again, alienation comes down and some identifications go up (as the single squeeze occurs), but this time we want the decline in alienation to dominate the proceedings. This is tantamount to an upper bound on α.
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The above arguments are made using Lemmas 6 and 7, which also begin the proof that the axioms are implied by our class of measures. The various steps for this direction of the proof, which essentially consist in verifying the axioms, are completed in Lemmas 8 through 11.
The approach to our characterization bears a superficial similarity to ER. Actually, the axioms are similar in spirit, dealing as they do in each case with issues of identification and alienation. However, their specific structure is fundamentally different. This is because our axioms strongly exploit the density structure of the model (in ER there are only discrete groupings). In turn, this creates basic differences in the method of proof. It is comforting that the two approaches yield the same functional characterization in the end, albeit with different numerical restrictions on the value of α.
Comparing Distributions.
The fundamental hypothesis underlying all of our analysis is that polarization is driven by the interplay of two forces: identification with one's own group and alienation vis-a-vis others. Our axioms yield a particular functional form to the interaction between these two forces. When comparing two distributions, which should we expect to display the greater polarization? Our informal answer is that this should depend on the separate contributions of alienation and identification and on their joint co-movement. Increased alienation is associated with an increase in income distances. Increased identification would manifest itself in a sharper definition of groups, i.e., the already highly populated points in the distribution becoming even more populated at the expense of the less populated. Such a change would produce an increase in the variability of the density over the support of the distribution. Finally, when taken jointly, these effects may reinforce each other in the sense that alienation may be highest at the incomes that have experienced an increase in identification, or they may counterbalance each other. 8 One might ask: why do the arguments in this paragraph and the one just before lead to "compatible" thresholds for α? The reason is this: in the double-squeeze, there are cross-group alienations as well which permit a given increase in identification to have a stronger impact on polarization. Therefore the required threshold on α is smaller in this case.
To be sure, it is not possible to move these three factors around independently. After all, one density describes the income distribution and the three factors we have mentioned are byproducts of that density. Nevertheless, thinking in this way develops some intuition for polarization, which we will try and put to use in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
To pursue this line of reasoning, first normalize all incomes by their mean to make the results scale free. Fix a particular value of α, as given by Theorem 1.
[More on this parameter below.] The α-identification at income y, denoted by ι α (y), is measured by f (y) α . Hence, the average α-identificationῑ is defined by
The alienation between two individuals with incomes y and x is given by |y − x|. Therefore, the overall alienation felt by an individual with income y, a(y), is
and the average alienationā is
[Notice thatā is twice the Gini coefficient.] Now conduct a completely routine exercise. Define ρ as the normalized covariance between identification and alienation:
This is a more precise statement of the informal idea expressed at the start of this section.
There is one dimension, however, along which this decomposition lacks intuition. It is that α unavoidably enters into it: we make this explicit by using the term α-identification (though we will resort to "identification" when there is little risk of confusion). This sort of identification is not intrinsic to the density. Yet the formula itself is useful, for it tells us that -all other things being equal -greater variability in the density is likely to translate into greater polarization for that density, this effect making itself felt more strongly when α is larger. The reason is simple: the main ingredient for α-identification is the function x 1+α (see (4)), which is a strictly convex function of x.
Greater variability of density is reminiscent of multimodality, and therefore ties in with our graphical intuitions regarding polarization. We reiterate, however, that this is only one factor of several, and that often it may not be possible to change this factor in the direction of higher polarization without infringing the ceteris paribus qualification.
9 Nevertheless, the observation may be helpful in some situations, and we will invoke it in the empirical discussion of Section 4.2. Indeed, in unimodal situations (which present the most subtle problems as far as polarization is concerned), these factors can act as guides to simple visual inspection.
Estimation and Inference
We now turn to estimation issues regarding P α (F ), and associated questions of statistical inference.
3.1. Estimating P α (F ). The following rewriting of P α (F ) will be useful: Observation 1. For every distribution function F with associated density f and mean µ,
is a partial mean and where
Suppose that we wish to estimate P α (F ) using a random sample of n iid observations of income y i , i = 1, ..., n, drawn from the distribution F (y) and ordered such that
α by a suitable estimator f (y) α (to be examined below), and by replacing a(y) by a(y). Hence, we have
Note that y i is the empirical quantile for percentiles between (i − 1) /n and i/n. Hence, we may use
and thus define a(y i ) as
where µ is the sample mean. We have not yet discussed the estimator f (y) α , but will do so presently. Observe, however, that adding an exact replication of the sample to the original sample should not change the value of the estimator P α ( F ). Indeed, presuming that the 12 estimators f (·) α are invariant to sample size, this is indeed the case when formulae (9) and (12) are used. We record this formally as Observation 2. Let y = (y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n ) andỹ = (ỹ 1 ,ỹ 2 , ...,ỹ 2n ) be two vectors of sizes n and 2n respectively, ordered along increasing values of income. Suppose that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, y i =ỹ 2i−1 =ỹ 2i for all i = 1, ..., n. Let P α (F y ) be the polarization index defined by (9) and (12) for a vector of income y. Then, provided that f y (y i ) = fỹ(y i ) for i = 1, . . . , n, it must be that P α (F y ) = P α (Fỹ).
Remark. We may call this feature (sample) population-invariance.
10 When observations are weighted (or "grouped"), with w i being the sampling weight on observation i and with w = n j=1 w j being the sum of weights, a population-invariant definition of g(y i ) is then:
(12) is a special case of (13) obtained when w i = 1 for all i. For analytical simplicity, we focus below on the case of samples with unweighted iid observations.
f (y i )
α and the Sampling Distribution of P α ( F ). It will be generally desirable to adjust our estimator of f (y i ) α to sample size in order to minimize the sampling error of estimating the polarization indices. To facilitate a more detailed discussion of this issue, first decompose the estimator P α ( F ) across its separate sources of sampling variability:
The first source of variation, p α (y) − p α (y), comes from the sampling error made in estimating the identification and the alienation effects at each point y in the income distribution. It can be decomposed further as:
α vanishes as n tends to infinity (as will be shown in the proof of Theorem 2), the last term in (15) is of lower order than the others and can therefore be ignored asymptotically. 10 It is not to be confused with the conceptual discussion of what happens to polarization if the true population size is changed (and not that of the sample).
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This argument also shows that (14) is of order o(n −1/2 ) and can also be ignored. Combining (14) and (15), we thus see that for large n,
The terms (17) and (18) are further developed in the proof of Theorem 2 in the appendix.
We thus turn to the estimation of f (y) α in (16), which we propose to do nonparametrically using kernel density estimation
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. This uses a kernel function K(u), defined such that
. It is also convenient to choose a kernel function that is symmetric around 0, with uK(u)du = 0 and
where
The parameter h is usually referred to as the bandwidth (or window width, or smoothing parameter). For simplicity, we assume it to be invariant across y, though we discuss later how it should optimally be set as a function of sample size. One kernel function that has nice continuity and differentiability properties is the Gaussian kernel, defined by
a form that we will use later for illustrative purposes.
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With f (y) α estimated according to this general technique, we have the following theorem on the asymptotic sampling distribution of P α . Theorem 2. Assume that the order-2 population moments of
and y
Observe that the assertion of Theorem 2 is distribution-free since everything in (21) can be estimated consistently without having to specify the population distribution from which the sample is drawn. P α ( F ) is thus a root-n consistent estimator 11 The literature on kernel density estimation is large -see for instance Silverman (1986) , Härdle (1990) and Pagan and Ullah (1999) for an introduction to it.
12 Note that the Gaussian kernel has the property that σ 2 K = 1.
14 of P α (F ), unlike the usual non-parametric density and regression estimators which are often n 2/5 consistent. The strength of Theorem 2 also lies in the fact that so long as h tends to vanish as n increases, the precise path taken by h has a negligible influence on the asymptotic variance since it does not appear in (21).
3.3. The Minimization of Sampling Error. In finite samples, however, P α ( F ) is biased. The bias arises from the smoothing techniques employed in the estimation of the density function f (y). In addition, the finite-sample variance of P α ( F ) is also affected by the smoothing techniques. As is usual in the non-parametric literature, the larger the value of h, the larger the finite-sample bias, but the lower is the finitesample variance. We can exploit this tradeoff to choose an "optimal" bandwidth for the estimation of P α ( F ), which we denote by h * (n). A common technique is to select h * (n) so as to minimize the mean square error (MSE) of the estimator, given a sample of size n. To see what this entails, decompose (for a given h) the MSE into the sum of the squared bias and of the variance involved in estimating P α (F ):
and denote by h * (n) the value of h which minimizes MSE h (P α ( F )). This value is described in the following theorem:
It is well known that f (y) is proportional to the bias of the estimatorf (y). A large value of ασ 2 K f (y)p α (y)dy 2 will thus necessitate a lower value of h * (n) in order to reduce the bias. Conversely, a larger negative correlation between v α (y) and p α (y) will militate in favor of a larger h * (n) in order to decrease the sampling variance. More importantly, the optimal bandwidth for the estimation of the polarization index is of order O(n −1/2 ), unlike the usual kernel estimators which are of significantly larger order O(n −1/5 ). Because of this, we may expect the precise choice of h not to be overly influential on the sampling precision of polarization estimators 13 . To compute h * (n), two general approaches can be followed. We can assume that f (y) is not too far from a parametric density function, such as the normal or the log-normal, and use (24) to compute h * (n) (for instance, in the manner of Silverman (1986, p.45) for point density estimation). Alternatively, we can estimate the terms in (24) directly from the empirical distribution, using an initial value of h to compute the f (y) in the v α (y) and p α (y) functions. For both of these approaches (and particularly for the last one), expression (24) is clearly distribution specific, and it will also generally be very cumbersome to estimate.
It would thus seem useful to devise a "rule-of-thumb" formula that can be used to provide a readily-computable value for h. When the true distribution is that of a normal distribution with variance σ 2 , and when a Gaussian kernel (see (20)) is used to estimatef (y) , h * is approximately given by:
Easily computed, this formula works well with the normal distribution 14 since it is never farther than 5% from the h * that truly minimizes the MSE. The use of such approximate rules also seems justified by the fact that the MSE of the polarization indices does not appear to be overly sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth h. (25) seems to perform relatively well with other distributions than the normal, including the popular log-normal one, although this is less true when the distribution becomes very skewed. For skewness larger than about 6, a more robust -though more cumbersome -approximate formula for the computation of h * is given by
where IQ is the interquartile and σ ln is the variance of the logarithms of incomean indicator of the skewness of the income distribution.
An Illustration
We illustrate our axiomatic and statistical results with data drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data sets 15 on 21 countries for each of Wave 3 (1989 Wave 3 ( -1992 and Wave 4 (1994 Wave 4 ( -1997 . Countries, survey years and abbreviations are listed in Table 1 . [All figures and tables for this section are located at the end of the paper.] We use household disposable income (i.e., post-tax-and-transfer income) normalized by an adult-equivalence scale defined as s 0.5 , where s is household size. Observations with negative incomes are removed as well as those with incomes exceeding 50 times the average (this affects less than 1% of all samples). Household observations are weighted by the LIS sample weights times the number of persons in the household. As discussed in Section 2.4.1, the usual homogeneity-of-degreezero property is imposed throughout by multiplying the indices P α (F ) by µ α−1 or equivalently by normalizing all incomes by their mean. For ease of comparison, all indices are divided by 2, so that P α=0 (F ) is the usual Gini coefficient. Tables 2 and 3 show estimates of the Gini (P 0 ) and four polarization indices (P α for α = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) in 21 countries for each of the two waves, along with their asymptotic standard deviations. The polarization indices are typically rather precisely estimated, with often only the third decimal of the estimators being subject to sampling variability. We can use these indices to create country rankings, with a high rank corresponding to a relatively large value of the relevant index. The tables show these rankings as well, and for each wave we display countries by their order in the Gini ranking.
Results.
Observe that P 0 and P 0.25 induce very similar rankings. But considerable differences arise between P 0 and P 1 , or between P 0.25 and P 1 . For instance, for Wave 14 Extensive numerical simulations were made using various values of n ≥ 500 , σ and α = 0.25 to 1. The results are available from the authors upon request. 15 See http://lissy.ceps.lu for detailed information on the structure of these data. 3, the Czech Republic has the lowest Gini index of all countries, but ranks 11 in terms of P 1 . Conversely, Canada, Australia and the United States exhibit high Gini inequality, but relatively low "P 1 -polarization". The Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices (showing respectively the correlation across different indices and across different rankings) are shown in Table  4 . Both correlation coefficients fall as the distance between the α's increases. The lowest correlation of all -0.6753 -is the rank correlation between the Gini index and P 1 in Wave 3. Clearly, polarization and inequality are naturally correlated, but they are also empirically distinct in this dataset. Moreover, the extent to which inequality comparisons resemble polarization comparisons depend on the parameter α, which essentially captures the power of the identification effect.
One might respond to this observation as follows: our axiomatics do not rule out values of α very close to 0.25. Hence, in the strict sense of a partial order we are unable to (empirically) distinguish adequately between inequality and polarization, at least with the dataset at hand. In our opinion this response would be too hasty. Our characterization not only implies a partial ordering, it provides a very clean picture of how that ordering is parameterized, with the parameter α having a definite interpretation. If substantial variations in ranking occur as α increases, this warrants a closer look, and certainly shows -empirically -how "large" subsets of polarization indices work very differently from the Gini inequality index. 16 Which countries are more polarized? To answer this question, we implicitly rely on the decomposition exercise carried out in Section 2.5, in which we obtained (7), reproduced here for convenience:
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the relevant statistics for all Wave 3 and Wave 4 countries, decomposing polarization as the product of average alienation, average identification and (one plus) the normalized covariance between the two. Consider Wavevalues of α (below 0.25) so that for all α ∈ [0.25, 1] the polarization ranking opposes the inequality ranking. This is the case (for Wave 3) for Belgium-Sweden, ItalyCanada and Israel-Australia. Crossings could -and do -occur for intermediate values of α ∈ [0.25, 1]. To be sure, they may not occur for any α ≤ 1, thus causing the polarization ordering to coincide with the inequality ordering. This is indeed a most frequent case for pairwise comparisons in Wave 3. Finally, in Wave 4 we also observe "double crossings" in the cases of Canada-France and Australia-Poland. In both cases the first country starts with higher inequality, P 0 , followed by a lower value of P 0.25 , but later returning to higher values for larger values of α.
Tables 7-9 summarize tests of the statistical significance of these cross-country rankings, so that we know which of the rankings may be reasonably attributed to true population differences in inequality and polarization. We show the results for Wave 3 countries, and for α = 0, 0.25 and 1. The tables display p-values for tests that the countries listed on the rows show more inequality (Table 7) or polarization (Tables 8 and 9 ) than countries on the column. Roughly speaking, these p-values indicate the probability that an error is made when one rejects the null hypotheses that countries on the first row do not have a larger P α than countries on the first column, in favor of the alternative hypotheses that P α is indeed greater for the countries on the first row. More formally, such p-values are the maximal test sizes that will lead to the rejection of the above null hypotheses. Using a conventional test size of 5%, it can be seen that the majority (all those with a *, around 90%) of the possible cross-country comparisons are statistically significant. This is true for all three values of α.
4.2. Discussion. It may be worth drawing out a few specific instances in more detail. We have chosen the Czech Republic, the UK and the US (Wave 3), because these countries illustrate well the points we have made so far.
For α = 0.25, the Czech Republic has the lowest average alienation and the highest average α-identification. For this value of α it is the country with the lowest degree of polarization. Yet, for α = 1, the Czech Republic ascends to the eleventh position in the ranking. This is to be contrasted with the US which begins in the nineteenth position, but then slides down the rankings as α goes up, finally equaling (and even falling slightly below) the Czech Republic. But perhaps the most interesting relative behavior is exhibited by the US-UK pair. UK inequality is very close to US inequality; for all intents and purposes the two have the same Gini in Wave 3. Indeed, the UK ranks eighteenth and the US nineteenth (this is also true when α = 0.25). However, as α goes up to 1, the UK retains the nineteenth position, while the US descends to ninth in the rankings.
In what follows, keep in mind the decomposition (7). Now observe that average alienation cannot change with α, so the US-UK contrast must stem from very different responses of the identification component of each country to an increase in α. To be sure, this must mean in turn that the two densities are very different, and indeed, Figure 6 , which superimposes one density on the other, shows that they are. The US distribution shows a remarkably flat density on the interval [0.25, 1.25] of normalized incomes and so has thick tails. In contrast, the UK displays a clear mode at y = 0.4 and thinner tails.
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Can two such distributions exhibit the same inequality as measured by the Gini? They certainly can, and in the US-UK case, they do. 17 Yet, while maintaining the same average alienation, the UK density exhibits higher variability than its US counterpart. Because -as already discussed in Section 2.5 -the identification function f α times the density f is strictly convex in f , the country with the greater variation in identification will exhibit a higher value of average identification, with the difference growing more pronounced as α increases. This is as it should be: controlling for overall alienation, the country with greater variation in identification will be singled out as more polarized, and this tendency will be augmented by increases in α. To be sure, variations in identification find their starkest expression when distributions are multimodal, but even without such multimodality, variation is possible.
The Czech-US comparison further supplements this sort of reasoning. Consult Figure 7 in what follows. Here, the basic inequality comparison is unambiguous (in contrast to the US-UK example): the Czech Republic has lower inequality than the US. But the Czech Republic has a spikier density with greater variation in it. This "shadow of multimodality" kicks in as α is increased, so much so that the Czech Republic is actually deemed equally or more polarized than the US by the time α = 1.
One must be careful on the following counts. We should remember that variation in identification is only one of several factors: in particular, we do not mean to suggest that the country with the greater variation in identification will invariably exhibit greater polarization as α → 1. For instance, our notion of a squeeze increases the variability of identification, but polarization must fall, by Axiom 1 (this is because alienation falls too with the squeeze). See footnote 9 for another illustration of this point.
Final Remarks, and a Proposed Extension
In this paper we present and characterize a class of measures for income polarization, based on what we call the identification-alienation structure. Our approach is fundamentally based on the view that inter-personal alienation fuels a polarized society, as does inequality. Our departure from inequality measurement lies in the notion that such alienation must also be complemented by a sense of identification. This combination of the two forces generates a class of measures that are sensitive (in the same direction) to both elements of inequality and equality, depending on where these changes are located in the overall distribution.
Our characterization, and the alternative decomposition presented in (7), permit us to describe the measure very simply: for any income distribution, polarization is the product of average alienation, average identification, and (one plus) the meannormalized covariance between these two variables.
We discuss estimation issues for our measures in detail, as well as associated questions of statistical inference.
We wish to close this paper with some remarks on what we see to be the main conceptual task ahead. Our analysis generates a certain structure for identification and alienation functions in the special case in which both identification and alienation are based on the same characteristic. This characteristic can be income or wealth. In 17 While the US distribution has flatter tails, the UK distribution exhibits a significant mode lower than the mean income. The two effects cancel each other as far as the Gini is concerned.
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principle it could be any measurable feature with a well-defined ordering. The key restriction, however, is that whatever we choose the salient characteristic for identification to be, inter-group alienation has to be driven by the very same characteristic. This seems obvious in the cases of income or wealth. Yet, for some relevant social characteristics this might not be a natural assumption. Think of the case of ethnic polarization. It may or may not seem appropriate here to base inter-ethnic alienation as only depending on some suitably defined "ethnicity distance". In the cases of socially based group identification we find it more compelling to adopt a multi-dimensional approach to polarization, permitting alienation to depend on characteristics other than the one that defines group identity. In this proposed extension, we liberally transplant our findings to the case of social polarization, but with no further axiomatic reasoning. In our opinion, such reasoning is an important subject of future research.
Suppose, then, that there are M "social groups", based on region, kin, ethnicity, religion... Let n j be the number of individuals in group j, with overall population normalized to one. Let F j describe the distribution of income in group j (with f j the accompanying density), unnormalized by group population. One may now entertain a variety of "social polarization measures". 5.1. Pure Social Polarization. Consider, first, the case of "pure social polarization", in which income plays no role. Assume that each person is "fully" identified with every other member of his group. Likewise, the alienation function takes on values that are specific to group pairs and have no reference to income. Then a natural transplant of (3) yields the measure
where ∆ jk represents intergroup alienation. Even this sort of specification may be too general in some interesting instances in which individuals are interested only in the dichotomous perception Us/They. In particular, in these instances, individuals are not interested in differentiating between the different opposing groups. Perhaps the simplest instance of this is a pure contest (Esteban and Ray [1999] ), which yields the variant 
One could expand (or contract) the importance of income further, while still staying away from the extremes. For instance, suppose that -in addition to the incomemediation of group identity -alienation is also income-mediated (for alienation, two individuals must belong to different groups and have different incomes). Now groups have only a demarcating role -they are necessary (but not sufficient) for identity, and they are necessary (but not sufficient) for alienation. The resulting measure would look like this:
Note that we do not intend to suggest that other special cases or hybrids are not possible, or that they are less important. The discussion here is only to show that social and economic considerations can be profitably combined in the measurement of polarization. Indeed, it is conceivable that such measures will perform better than the more commonly used fragmentation measures in the analysis of social conflict. But a full exploration of this last theme must await a future paper.
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. In the first half of the proof, we show that axioms 1-4 imply (3). Lemma 1. Let g be a continuous real-valued function defined on IR such that for all x > 0 and all δ with 0 < δ < x,
Then g must be a concave function.
Proof. This is a well-known implication of Jensen's characterization of concave functions.
In what follows, keep in mind that the basic structure of our measure only considers income differences across people, and not the incomes per se. Therefore we may slide any distribution to the left or right as we please, without disturbing the analysis (even negative incomes may be considered when these are expositionally convenient). Lemma 2. The function T must be concave in a for every i > 0. Proof. Fix x > 0, some i > 0, and some value of δ ∈ (0, x). Consider the following specialization of the setting of Axiom 2. We take three basic densities as in that Axiom (see also Figure 1 ) but specialize as shown in Figure 4 ; each is a transform of a uniform basic density. The bases are centered at −x, 0 and x. The side densities are of width 2δ and height h, and the middle density is of width 2 and height i. In the sequel, we shall vary and h but to make sure that Axiom 2 applies, we choose > 0 such that δ + < x. It is easy to check that a λ-squeeze of the side densities simply implies that the base of the rectangle is contracted to a width 2λδ (keeping the centering unchanged), while the height is raised to h/λ. See Figure  4 . For each λ, we may decompose the polarization measure (1) into five distinct components. First, there is the "internal polarization" of the middle rectangle, call it P m . This component is unchanged as we change λ so there will be no need to explicitly calculate it. Next, there is the "internal polarization" of each of the side rectangles, call it P s . Third, there is the total effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of the middle towards each side density. Call this A ms . Fourth, there is the total effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of each side towards the middle. Call this A sm . Finally, there is the total effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of one side towards the other side. Call this A ss . Observe that each of these last four terms appear twice, so that (writing everything as a function of λ),
Now we compute the terms on the right hand side of (32). First,
where (here and in all subsequent cases) b will stand for the "origin" income (to which the identification is applied) and b the "destination income" (towards which the antagonism is felt). Next,
And finally,
The axiom requires that P (λ) ≥ P (1). Equivalently, we require that [P (λ) − P (1)]/2h ≥ 0 for all h, which implies in particular that
If we divide through by h in the individual components calculated above and then send h to 0, it is easy to see that the only term that remains is A ms . Formally, (33) and the calculations above must jointly imply that
and this must be true for all λ ∈ (0, 1) as well as all ∈ (0, x − δ). Therefore we may insist on the inequality in (34) holding as λ → 0. Performing the necessary calculations, we may conclude that
for every ∈ (0, x − δ). Finally, take to zero in (35). This allows us to deduce that
As (36) must hold for every x > 0 and every δ ∈ (0, x), we may invoke Lemma 1 to conclude that T is concave in x for every i > 0.
Lemma 3. Let g be a concave, continuous function on IR + , with g(0) = 0. Suppose that for each a and a with a > a > 0, there exists∆ > 0 such that
for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆). Then g must be linear.
Proof. Given the concavity of g, it is easy to see that
for all a > a ≥ ∆ > 0. Combining this information with (37), we may conclude that for each a and a with a > a > 0, there exists∆ > 0 such that
for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆). This, coupled with the premises that g is concave and g(0) = 0, shows that g is linear.
Lemma Proof. Fix numbers a and a with a > a > 0, and i > 0. Consider the following specialization of Axiom 3: take four basic densities as in that Axiom (see also Figure 3 ) but specialize as shown in Figure 5 ; each is a transform of a uniform basic density. The bases are centered at locations −y, −x, x and y, where x ≡ (a − a )/2 and y ≡ (a + a )/2. The "inner" densities are of width 2δ and height h, and the "outer" densities are of width 2 and height i. In the sequel, we shall vary δ, and h but to make sure that the basic densities have disjoint support, we restrict ourselves to values of δ and such that < x and δ + < y − x −∆ for some∆ > 0. For convenience, the rectangles have been numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 for use below. The exercise that we perform is to increase x by the small amount ∆, where 0 < ∆ <∆, as defined above. Given this configuration, we may decompose the polarization measure (1) into several distinct components. First, there is the "internal polarization" of each rectangle j; call it P j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4. These components are unchanged as we change x so there will be no need to calculate them explicitly. Next, there is the total effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of each rectangle towards another; call this A jk (x), where j is the "origin" rectangle and k is the "destination" rectangle. [We emphasize the dependence on x, which is the parameter to be varied.] Thus total polarization P (x), again written explicitly 24 as a function of x, is given by
There is a continuous function φ(i) such that T (i, a) = φ(i)a for all i and a.
where the second equality simply exploits obvious symmetries and A 14 is noted to be independent of x. Let's compute the terms in this formula that do change with x. We have
and
Now, the axiom requires that P (x + ∆) − P (x) ≥ 0. Equivalently, we require that [P (x + ∆) − P (1)]/2ih ≥ 0 for all h, which implies in particular that
Using this information along with the computations for P (x) and the various A jk (x)'s, we see that
where in arriving at this inequality, we have carried out some elementary substitution of variables and transposition of terms. Dividing through by δ in this expression and then taking δ to zero, we may conclude that
and dividing this inequality, in turn, by and taking to zero, we see that
where we use the observations that x + y = a and y − x = a . Therefore the conditions of Lemma 3 are satisfied, and T (i, .) must be linear for every i > 0 since T (0, a) := 0. But this only means that there is a function φ(i) such that T (i, a) = φ(i)a for every i and a. Given that T is continuous by assumption, the same must be true 25 of φ.
Lemma 5. φ(i) must be of the form Ki α , for constants (K, α) 0.
Proof. As a preliminary step, observe that
[For, if this were false for some i, Axiom 3 would fail for configurations constructed from rectangular basic densities of equal height i.] Our first objective is to prove that φ must satisfy the fundamental Cauchy equation
for every strictly positive p and p . To this end, fix p and p and define r ≡ pp .
In what follows, we assume that p ≥ r. [If r ≥ p, simply permute p and r in the argument below.] Consider the following configuration. There are two basic densities, both of width 2 , the first centered at 0 and the second centered at 1. The heights are p and h (where h is any strictly positive number, soon to be made arbitrarily small). It is easy to see that the polarization of this configuration, P , is given by
where the first equality invokes Lemma 4 and both equalities use routine computations. Now change the height of the first rectangle to r . Using (38) and the provisional assumption that p ≥ r, it is easy to see that for each , there must exist a (unique) height for the second rectangle -call it h( ), such that the polarizations of the two configurations are equated. Invoking (40), we equivalently choose h( ) such that
By Axiom 4, it follows that for all λ > 0,
Notice that as ↓ 0, h( ) lies in some bounded set. We may therefore extract a convergent subsequence with limit h as ↓ 0. By the continuity of φ, we may pass to the limit in (41) and (42) to conclude that
Combining (43) and (44), we see that
Taking limits in (45) as h → 0 and noting that h → 0 as a result (examine (43) to confirm this), we have for all λ > 0,
(λr) .
Put λ = 1/p and recall that r = pp . Then (46) yields the required Cauchy equation (39). To complete the proof, recall that φ is continuous and that (38) holds. The class of solutions to (39) (that satisfy these additional qualifications) is completely described by φ(p) = Kp α for constants (K, α) 0 (see, e.g., Aczél [1966, p. 41, Theorem 3] ).
Lemmas 4 and 5 together establish "necessity", though it still remains to establish the bounds on α. We shall do so along with our proof of "sufficiency", which we begin now. First notice that each basic density f with mass p, support [a, b] and mean µ may be connected to its root -call it f * -by means of three numbers. First, we slide the density so that it begins at 0; this amounts to a slide of a to the left. The new mean is now m ≡ µ − a . Second, we income-scale the density so as to change its mean from m = µ − a to 1. Finally, we population-scale to change the overall mass of the density from p to unity.
Lemma 6. Let f be a basic density with mass p and mean µ on support [a, b] . Let m ≡ µ−a and let f * denote the root of f . Then, if f λ denotes some λ-squeeze of f , (47)
Proof. Let f be given as in the statement of the lemma. Recall that a slide of the entire distribution has no effect on the computations, so we may as well set a = 0 and b = 2m, where m = µ − a is now to be interpreted as the mean. Given (3),
for some k > 0. Using the fact that f is symmetric, we can write
Examine the very last term in (49). Change variables by setting z ≡ 2m − y , and use symmetry to deduce that Substituting this in (49), and manipulating terms, we obtain (50)
Now suppose that f
λ is a λ-squeeze of f . Note that ( 50) holds just as readily for f λ as for f . Therefore, using the expression for f given in (2), we see that . Then it is easy to see that
To complete the proof, we must recover the root f * from f . To this end, first population-scale f to h, where h has mass 1. That is, f (z) = ph(z) for all z. Doing so, we see that 
where A(f λ , g) denotes the total effective antagonism felt by members of f λ towards members of g.
Proof.
To begin with, ignore the λ-squeeze. Notice that there is no loss of generality in assuming that every income under g dominates every income under f . It also makes no difference to polarization whether or not we slide the entire configuration to the left or right. Therefore we may suppose that f has support [0, 2m] (with mean m ) and g has support [d, d + 2m] (where obviously we must have d ≥ 2m for the 28 disjoint support assumption to make sense). Because (48) is true, it must be that
where the third equality exploits the symmetry of g, 19 the fourth equality uses the fact that
g(y) = q/2, and the final equality uses the symmetry of f . 20 To be sure, this formula applies to any λ -squeeze of f , so that
and making the change of variables
, we may conclude that
To complete the proof, we must recover the root f * from f . As in the proof of Lemma 6, first population-scale f to h, where h has mass 1. That is, f (z) = ph(z) for all z. Doing so, we see that
Finally, make the change of variables x = x /m. Noting that f * (z) = mh(mz), we get (51).
Lemma 8. Define, for any root f and α > 0,
Then -for any α > 0 -ψ(f, α) attains its minimum value when f is the uniform root, and this minimum value equals 3.
Proof. It will be useful to work with the inverse function
Note that ζ(f, α) may be viewed as a weighted average of
as this expression varies over x ∈ [0, 1], where the "weight" on a particular x is just
which integrates over x to 1. Now observe that L(x) is decreasing in x. Moreover, by the unimodality of a root, the weights must be nondecreasing in x. It follows that
Because f (x) is nondecreasing and integrates to 1/2 on [0, 1], it must be the case that
(x − y)/2dy for all x ≤ 1. Using this information in (55) and combining it with ( 54),
where u stands for the uniform root taking constant value 1/2 on [0, 2]. Simple integration reveals that ζ(u, α) = 1/3. Lemma 9. Given that P (f ) is of the form (48) Proof. Consider a configuration as given in Axiom 2: a symmetric distribution made out of three basic densities. By symmetry, the side densities must share the same root; call this f * . Let p denote their (common) population mass and m their (common) difference from their means to their lower support. Likewise, denote the root of the middle density by g * , by q its population mass, and by n the difference between mean and lower support. As in the proof of Lemma 2, we may 30 decompose the polarization measure (48) into several components. First, there are the "internal polarizations" of the middle density (P m ) and of the two side densities (P s ). Next, there are various subtotals of effective antagonism felt by members of one of the basic densities towards another basic density. Let A ms denote this when the "origin" density is the middle and the "destination" density one of the sides. Likewise, A sm is obtained by permuting origin and destination densities. Finally, denote by A ss the total effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of one side towards the other side. Observe that each of these last four terms appear twice, so that (writing everything as a function of λ), overall polarization is given by
Compute these terms. For brevity, define for any root h,
Now, using Lemmas 6 and 7, we see that
(where it should be remembered that the distance between the means of the two side densities is 2d). Observe from these calculations that A ms (λ) is entirely insensitive to λ. Consequently, feeding all the computed terms into (57), we may conclude that
where C and D are positive constants independent of λ, and
by construction; see (52) in the statement of Lemma 8. It follows from this expression that for Axiom 2 to hold, it is necessary and sufficient that for every threedensity configuration of the sort described in that axiom,
must be nonincreasing in λ over (0, 1]. An examination of the expression in (58) quickly shows that a situation in which q is arbitrarily close to zero (relative to p) is a necessary and sufficient test case. By the same logic, one should make d/m as small as possible. The disjoint-support hypothesis of Axiom 2 tells us that this 31 lowest value is 1. So it will be necessary and sufficient to show that for every root f * ,
is nonincreasing in λ over (0, 1]. For any f * , it is easy enough to compute the necessary and sufficient bounds on α. Simple differentiation reveals that
must be nonnegative for every λ ∈ (0, 1]; the necessary and sufficient condition for this is
Therefore, to find the necessary and sufficient bound on α (uniform over all roots), we need to minimize ψ(f * , α) by choice of f * , subject to the condition that f * be a root. By Lemma 8 , this minimum value is 3. Using this information in (60), we are done.
Lemma 11. Given that P (f ) is of the form (48), Axiom 3 is satisfied.
Proof. Consider a symmetric distribution composed of four basic densities, as in the statement of Axiom 3. Number the densities 1, 2, 3 and 4, in the same order displayed in Figure 5 . Let x denote the amount of the slide (experienced by the inner densities) in the axiom. For each such x, let d jk (x) denote the (absolute) difference between the means of basic densities j and k. As we have done several times before, we may decompose the polarization of this configuration into several components. First, there is the "internal polarization" of each rectangle j; call it P j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4. [These will stay unchanged with x.] Next, there is the total effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of each basic density towards another; call this A jk (x), where j is the "origin" density and k is the "destination" density. Thus total polarization P (x), again written explicitly as a function of x, is given by
so that, using symmetry,
Now Lemma 7 tells us that for all i and j,
where k ij is a positive constant which is independent of distances across the two basic densities, and in particular is independent of x. Using this information in (61), it is trivial to see that
so that Axiom 3 is satisfied.
Given (48), Axiom 4 is trivial to verify. Therefore Lemmas 9, 10 and 11 complete the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Observation 1. First note that |x − y| = x + y − 2 min(x, y). Hence, by (3),
To prove (8), note that (62)
and that
The first term in (63) can be integrated by parts over x:
The last term in (63) can also be integrated by parts over x as follows:
is a partial mean. Adding terms yields (8), and completes the proof.
Proof of Observation 2. It will be enough to show that 2a y (y i ) = aỹ(ỹ 2i−1 )+aỹ(ỹ 2i ) since we have assumed that f y (y i ) = fỹ(ỹ 2i−1 ) = fỹ(ỹ 2i ) for all i = 1, . . . , n. Clearly, µ y = µỹ. Note also that aỹ(ỹ 2i−1 ) can be expressed as (66)
Similarly, for aỹ(ỹ 2i ), we have
Summing (66) and (67), we find
Adding up the product of f y (ỹ j )aỹ(ỹ j ) across j and dividing by 2n shows that P α ( F y ) = P α (Fỹ).
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider first (16). Note that
Taking h → 0 as n → ∞, and recalling that K h (y − y i ) dy = 1, the first term in (69) tends asymptotically to
Thus, we can rewrite the term on the right-hand side of (16) as
Now turn to (17). Let I be an indicator function that equals 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise. We find:
34
Now consider (18):
Collecting and summarizing terms, we obtain:
Applying the law of large numbers to P α ( F )−P α (f ), note that lim n→∞ I E n 0.5 P α ( F ) − P α (f ) = 0. The central limit theorem then leads to the finding that n 0.
, with V α as described in the statement of the theorem. Wave 3 data (a * indicates a p-value ≤ 5%) cz92 fi91 be92 sw92 nw91 dk92 lx91 ge89 nl91 rc91 pl92 fr89 hu91 it91 cn91 is92 as89 uk91 us91 ru92 mx89 cz92 0.50 0.45 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* fi91 0.55 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* be92 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.18 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* sw92 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.50 0.09 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* nw91 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.50 0.09 0.10 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* dk92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.50 0.35 0.03* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* lx91 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.90 0.65 0.50 0.13 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* ge89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.87 0.50 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* nl91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.50 0.09 0.05* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* rc91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.50 0.22 0.00* 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* pl92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.78 0.50 0.05* 0.11 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* fr89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.50 0.43 0.05* 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* hu91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.89 0.57 0.50 0.21 0.18 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* it91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.79 0.50 0.45 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* cn91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.82 0.55 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* is92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.24 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* as89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* uk91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.41 0.00* 0.00* us91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.50 0.00* 0.00* ru92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00* mx89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 Table 8 : p-values for polarization indices, α = 0.25
Wave 3 data (a * indicates a p-value ≤ 5%) cz92 fi91 sw92 be92 nw91 dk92 lx91 ge89 nl91 rc91 pl92 fr89 hu91 cn91 it91 as89 is92 uk91 us91 ru92 mx89 cz92 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* fi91 1.00 0.50 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* sw92 1.00 0.98 0.50 0.09 0.09 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* be92 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.50 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* nw91 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.54 0.50 0.08 0.07 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* dk92 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.50 0.22 0.00* 0.00* 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* lx91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.02* 0.00* ru92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.50 0.00* mx89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 Table 9 : p-values for polarization indices, α = 1
Wave 3 data (a * indicates a p-value ≤ 5%) fi91 sw92 be92 dk92 nw91 cn91 ge89 as89 us91 lx91 cz92 it91 pl92 fr89 hu91 nl91 rc91 is92 uk91 ru92 mx89 fi91 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* sw92 1.00 0.50 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* be92 1.00 0.98 0.50 0.09 0.09 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* dk92 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.50 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* nw91 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.54 0.50 0.08 0.07 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* cn91 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.50 0.22 0.00* 0.00* 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* ge89 
